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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
65B(i)(10). Therefore, jurisdiction is appropriate, 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from an Order and Judgment of the Third 
Judicial District Court, in and for Sale lake County, State of 
Utah the Honorable Judge John Rokich, denying the extraordinary 
writ of Petitioner/Appellant. 
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDING 
Petitioner/Appellant filled a Writ of Habeas Corpus, which 
was denied by the Honorable Judge Scott Daniels, on the 23rd day 
of July, 1987. Petitioner/Appellant filed a Petition for Relief 
under Rule 65B(i) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Said 
petition was dismissed by Honorable Judge John Rokich on the 22nd 
day of February, 1989. Petitioner/Appellant filed his Notice of 
Appeal on the 9th day of March, 1989. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action arises out of the sentencing of Petitioner on 
two different occasions for the same admitted conduct which 
breached Petitioner's probation requirements. The initial 
sentencing re-instituted probation for the Petitioner. The 
second sentencing revoked probation and committed Petitioner to 
serve his original prison term. 
a. On May 24, 1985 Petitioner was sentenced, after 
entering a guilty plea to Aggravated Robbery, by Judge Wilkinson, 
of the Third Judicial District Court, but allowed probation. 
b. On December 9, 1985 he was arrested and subsequently 
charged with robbery. 
c. On the 27th day of December, 1985, Petitioner entered a 
plea of Guilty to an information alleging the commission of a 
robbery. 
d. On February 7, 1986, he was brought before Judge 
Wilkinson on an Order to Show Cause why his probation should not 
be revoked. The affidavit in support of the Motion for Order to 
Show Cause alleged that he committed robbery an, in addition, 
that he had failed to report to his probation officer, and had 
failed to make restitution, and had failed to participate in a 
program to complete community service hours as ordered by the 
Court. 
e. At the February 7, 1986 hearing, the Petitioner 
admitted to the allegations of the Complaint. 
f. At the time of this hearing, Judge Wilkinson knew of 
the plea of guilty to the robbery charge, but, nevertheless, 
reinstated the Petitioner's probation. 
g. Petitioner was sentenced on the robbery charge on the 
14th day of February, 1986 and committed to the Utah State 
Prison, to serve a sentence not less than one, nor more than 15 
2 
years in prison. 
h. On the 11th day of April, 1986, petitioner was again 
Ordered to show cause why his probation should not be revoked. 
The affidavit in support of the Motion to Show Cause, from which 
the Order issued, alleged the same commission of the robbery as 
alleged in the affidavit and Complaint for the February 7, 1986, 
Order to Show Cause hearing. Petitioner did not receive notice 
of this second hearing until the morning of the April 11th, 1986 
hearing, and had no opportunity to discuss the matter with an 
attorney, except to be advised that he should admit the 
allegations again. 
i. At the April 11th, 1986 hearing on the Order to Show 
Cause, Judge Wilkinson revoked Petitioner's probation and 
committed him to serve a five to life term for the aggravated 
robbery charge. 
j. Honorable Judge Scott Daniels, of the Third Judicial 
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, denied Petitioner's 
Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, stating that the double 
jeopardy clause of the Utah and United States' constitutions did 
not apply to the Petitioner. 
k. Honorable Judge John Rokich dismissed the Petitioner's 
Complaint for Relief, indicating that he had no authority to 
overturn the decision of a judge of equal standing. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Appellant in this matter is contending that the Trial 
Courts incorrectly determined that the double jeopardy clause of 
the United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution do not 
apply to Petitioner in the setting of a probation revocation 
proceeding. Additionally, Appellant contends that he was denied 
due process of law because of failing to receive timely notice of 
the second probation revocation order to show cause. 
Appellant argues that the prohibition against placing a 
person in jeopardy twice for the same offense does apply to a 
probationer, not withstanding any reduction in other rights that 
a person who has been found guilty, or has plead guilty to 
certain criminal conduct might experience. The protection for 
which the double jeopardy clauses were included in the 
Constitutions are as necessary for the convicted person as they 
are for the non-convicted person. To deny petitioner the 
protection from facing multiple prosecutions for the same alleged 
violations of probation provisions would be to open the door to 
continual harassment of the probationer if the probation 
officials or prosecutors didn't like the actions of the judge. 
It also allows a judge to be capricious and arbitrary in his or 
her sentencing procedures of a probationer. 
That Petitioner was not served with the Order to Show Cause, 
and was not informed of the requirement to appear and show cause 
until the morning of the hearing denied Petitioner the right to 
due process of law by limiting his ability to prepare for the 
hearing, and by limiting his ability to adequately defend his 
position at said hearing. 
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ARGUMENT I 
THE PROTECTION OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH HAVE BEEN WRONGFULLY 
WITHHELD FROM THE PETITIONER 
The Constitution of the United States provides that no 
person shall twice be placed in jeopardy for the same offense. 
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5. The Constitution of Utah also 
proscribes placing a person at risk of losing liberty twice for 
the same offense. Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 12. 
The United States Supreme Court has stated that "jeopardy 
denotes risk " Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528, 95 S.Ct. 
1779, 1785, 44 L.Ed.2d. 346 (1975). The Court further stated 
that those "risks" include the imposition of "...heavy pressures 
and burdens—psychological, physical, and financial—on a person 
charged." 421 U.S. at 529-530, 95 S.Ct. at 1785-1786. Applying 
the Breed v. Jones decision, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
in U.S. vs. Whitney. 649 F.2d 296 (C.A.Ga. 1981), stated: 
We do not ignore the fact that some of the 
consideration which prompted the Supreme Courtfs 
decision in Breed v. Jones are also present in parole 
and probation revocation proceedings. For example, 
parole and probation revocation proceedings may result 
in further imprisonment. 649 F.2d, at 298. 
The Whitney Court further stated, that conduct on the part of the 
government to bring revocation proceedings against a defendant 
would "undoubtedly... impose heavy pressures and burdens...on the 
probationer." 649 F.2d, at 298. 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals also held that double 
jeopardy clause bars a second enhancement proceeding when the 
evidence at the first enhancement proceedings was insufficient to 
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establish enhancement requisites, Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 
1347, certiorari granted. 102 S.Ct. 2927, 457 U.S. 1116, 73 
L.Ed.2d 1328, vacated 103 S.Ct. 776, on remand 708 F«2d 1020. 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals also held that the 
failure of a district court, in revoking defendant's probation 
and imposing sentence, to state whether two-year punishment on 
each of five counts of bank embezzlement ran concurrently or 
consecutively rendered them presumptively concurrent, so that 
said district court's subsequent order that they were to run 
consecutively, entered after defendant had commenced serving 
sentence, increased defendant's sentence in violation of Fifth 
Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy. U.S. vs. Naas. 755 
F.2d 1133. (C.A.La. 1985). 
The Naas Court also held: 
Jeopardy attached when the Defendant was returned 
to the state facility to commence serving his 
sentences, and that a subsequent order of the 
sentencing court that the sentences on each count were 
to run consecutively placed the Defendant in jeopardy a 
second time and was an illegal sentence subject to 
correction. 755 F.2d at 1138. 
The Naas Court also indicated that the Fifth Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution prohibits resentencing for the same offense. 
See Naas, supra at 1136. 
The petitioner was placed in jeopardy for the offense of 
aggravated robbery on the 1st day of February, 1985 when he was 
arraigned on that charge. Petitioner was subsequently placed on 
probation for the offense on the 24th day of May, 1985. There 
are no circumstances surrounding these facts which would raise 
questions or complaints. 
Petitioner was placed in jeopardy for the offense of robbery 
on the 27th day of December, 1985 when he was arraigned for that 
offense. He was again placed at risk of "heavy pressures and 
burdens" when he was ordered to appear and show cause at a 
probation revocation proceeding on the 7th day of February, 1986. 
As grounds for this revocation proceeding, the State set forth 
four alleged violations, including failure to report to his 
probation officer, a December 9, 1986 robbery (the one to which 
the Petitioner plead guilty on the 27th day of December, 1986), 
failure to make restitution payments, and failure to complete 
community work hours. 
While it may be argued that the February 7th hearing was the 
second phase of a double jeopardy, it appears well settled that 
the same offense may be alleged once as an original offense and 
as a probation violation without falling under the prohibition of 
double jeopardy contained in the U.S. and Utah Constitutions. It 
is not settled, however, that a second revocation proceeding, on 
the same facts as a first, does not fall within the 
constitutional prohibitions. 
At the February 7th, 1986 hearing, Petitioner entered a plea 
of guilty to the charges alleged. With knowledge of the 
Petitioner's actions, including the December 9, 1985 robbery 
violation and Petitioner's plea of guilty to same, the Judge 
reinstated Petitioner's probation. 
On the 14th day of February, 1986, Petitioner was sentenced 
on the robbery charge, and given a sentence to serve of 1 year to 
15 years. On the 11th day of April, Petitioner was again ordered 
to appear and show cause why his probation should not be revoked. 
As cause for the second revocation proceeding, the state alleged 
the December 9th robbery. This was exactly the same allegation 
of offense for which there had been a first revocation 
proceeding, and for which his probation was earlier continued. 
In essence, the State had failed to show that the probation 
should be revoked at the initial hearing. Pursuant to Bullard 
vs. Estelle, supra., the State's attempt to try again should have 
been barred by the double jeopardy clause. 
For the third time, Petitioner was placed at risk for the 
same offense, a December 9, 1985 robbery. Again, Petitioner 
plead guilty to the charge. While there may have been no problem 
with the first revocation hearing, the second hearing clearly 
violated the constitutional protection barring double jeopardy. 
Clearly Petitioner was at risk of losing his liberty. Even 
having been committed to serve a 1-15 year term, the imposition 
of the 5 to life terms for the aggravated robbery meant a longer 
prison term, both in terms of required service and possible 
service. According to U.S. v. Naas. supra., the adjustment of 
Petitioner's sentence after the first revocation hearing, which 
judgement would result in a greater punishment to the petitioner, 
by way of a longer prison sentejice, was an illegal sentence which 
should be corrected. Additionally, as is noted on the face of 
the Judgement and Sentence, signed by Judge Wilkinson, on the 
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11th day of April, 1986, this proceeding was a resentencing, 
clearly barred by the U.S. Constitution's fifth amendment. 
The Colorado Supreme Court has stated that where original 
petition to revoke probation was dismissed solely on procedural 
ground, no double jeopardy issue was involved, indicating that 
where probation was not dismissed after a hearing on the merits, 
a subsequent petition to revoke would place the Defendant twice 
at risk. People vs. Clark, 654 P.2d 847 (Colo. 1982). 
A Montana Court has held that prohibitions against double 
jeopardy do not preclude state from filing a second petition for 
revocation of suspended sentence alleging same facts as alleged 
in first decision which was dismissed without any determination 
on merits, again suggesting that where the probation has not been 
revoked, after a hearing on the merits, a second attempt by the 
State to revoke based on the same allegations of violation would 
constitute double jeopardy. State vs. Oppelt, 601 P.2d 394, 184 
Mont. 48 (Mont. 1979). 
The United States Supreme Court has noted that emphasis 
should be placed upon the "punishment" when considering the scope 
of the double jeopardy clause. The Court stated in U.S. vs. 
DiFrancesco. "It is the punishment that would legally follow the 
second conviction which is the real danger guarded against by the 
Constitution." U.S., at , 101 S.Ct. at 433, quoting Ex 
parte Lange. 18 Wall 163, 173, 21 L.Ed. 872 (1874). The plea of 
guilty, twice, to the same alleged offenses, is tantamount to a 
conviction. Once convicted, the Petitioner should not have been 
placed at risk a second time because the State didn't like the 
outcome of the first conviction. 
Petitioner was placed at risk by the imposition of "heavy 
burdens—psychological, physical, and financial," particularly in 
view of the fact that just two months before, his probation had 
not been revoked. Clearly, notwithstanding the legal names and 
procedures, the Petitioner was placed at risk of losing his 
liberty, and did in fact lose his liberty, for the same offense. 
Alternatively, the action of the Court, to revoke sentence 
during a second revocation proceeding for the same allegation as 
a first proceeding, could easily be construed or deemed as an 
enhancement of sentence. Indeed, the heading on the court 
documents stated that the proceeding was a "Re-sentencing 
Hearing," not only a revocation proceeding. 
The action of the Court, in amending or changing its 
previous granting of probation amounted to a increase in 
sentence, clearly barred the Court of Appeals in Naas« aiifLCa. As 
the Naas Court stated: 
The Fifth Amendment prohibition against 
resentencing for the same offense, however, bars an 
increase in a legal sentence once it has been imposed 
and the defendant has commenced serving it. This holds 
true even if the Court alters the sentence solely to 
conform to it original intent. 
The District Court did in fact lengthen the incarceration of the 
Petitioner by revoking his probation. Had revocation taken place 
during the February 7, 1986, hearing, Petitioner would possibly 
have no argument. During the 2nd hearing, the April hearing, 
however, the revocation of probation meant that rather than 
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serving the normally served portion of a 1-15 sentence, the 
Petitioner would at least have to serve the normally served 
portion of a 5 to life. 
The second revocation proceeding could also be deemed an 
enhancement of both the original sentence (on the aggravated 
robbery) and the sentence imposed for the robbery offense. For 
whatever reasons, the District Court did not revoke Petitioner's 
probation during the first revocation proceeding. By revoking 
his probation during the second proceeding the time to be served 
by the Petitioner, was enlarged, thus enhanced. The Court in 
Bullard vs. Estelle, supra, stated plainly that a second 
enhancement proceeding is barred by the double jeopardy clause. 
While it may be argued that Petitioner was not placed in 
jeopardy or at risk, and that the sentence was not enhanced or 
enlarged, the real outcome does not support such an argument. 
Had Petitioner not been subjected to the second revocation 
hearing, he would be serving a 1-15 sentence. After serving the 
required time for said sentence, he would be released, to 
complete the remaining time of his probation. In actuality, he 
must serve additional time for the 5 to life sentence. His 
prison confinement has in fact been enhanced and enlarged because 
of the second revocation proceeding. 
II. 
THE PETITIONER WAS DENIED THE DUE PROCESS 
OF LAW BY THE FAILURE TO RECEIVE PROPER AND TIMELY 
NOTICE OF THE APRIL 11, 1986, HEARING ON THE 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE. 
The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated 
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that Probationers are entitled to due process guarantees of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and probation hearings must comport with 
principals of fundamental fairness. United States vs. Brown. 656 
F.2d 1204 (C.A. TX 1981). Gagnon v. Scappelli. 411 U.S. 778, 93 
S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973). See also Morrissev v. Brewer. 
408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1979). 
An Order to Appear and Show Cause was issued by the Third 
Judicial District Court for both hearings on the Motions for 
Orders to Show Cause, resulting in hearings on the 7th day of 
February, 1986 and the 11th day of April, 1986. Rules of 
procedure require that the Order be served upon the Defendant. 
The Return of Service filed by the State indicating service 
states that the Order was served on the 20th day of March, 1986. 
The defendant has filed his affidavit in the Court below stating 
that he never received a copy of said Order to Show Cause. 
Petitioner was first made aware of the second revocation 
proceeding when he was taken into court, and told by an attorney, 
that he should merely plead guilty to the charges, and that there 
would be no change to the time he must serve, nor would there be 
any other alteration in his sentence. In fact, the Judge revoked 
Petitioner's probation and instituted the 5 to life sentence, 
substantially altering the time to be served and Petitioner's 
sentence. 
Had Petitioner been aware, as of the 6th day of April, 1986, 
five days prior to the scheduled hearing, that a second hearing 
was to take place, there is much preparation which might have 
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been made, thus perhaps altering the outcome of said hearing. In 
any event, the non-service worked a prejudice to the Petitioner, 
Because the service of the Order to Show Cause for the second 
hearing on the probation revocation allegations was not timely 
the hearing should not have taken place, and any orders made by 
the District Court at that time should be rendered null and void. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
There is a noticeable dearth of direction from either the 
Utah Supreme Court or Federal appellate courts for Utah on the 
issue of revocation proceedings the their relationship to the 
double jeopardy clauses of the U.S. and Utah Constitutions. 
Nevertheless, other courts have indicated that the punishment and 
fairness must be controlling while handling this issue. 
Petitioner argues that fairness and justice are best served by 
striking the second revocation procedure and reinstating his 
probation as it relates to his initial offense. 
DATED t h i s fcQ^day of J u l y , 1 9 8 9 . 
^ 
^ ~ 4~^£ 
Mark H. T a n n a r 
10/07/88 MHT2736A 
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ADDENDUM "A" ORDER DENYING WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TRACY ALLEN CANDELARIO, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
KENNETH SHULSEN, Warden of the 
Utah State Prison, State of 
Utah, Department of 
Corrections, 
Respondent. 
ORDER DENYING WRIT 
OF HABEAS CORPUS 
CIVIL NO. C-86-6627 
RECEIVED 
JUL 2&1987 
UTAH STATE OFFICE 
OF ATTORNEY GENERAL 
As I understand the facts of this case, the petitioner Tracy 
Allen Candelario was convicted of or pled guilty to Aggravated 
Robbery. On May 24, 1985 he was sentenced by Judge Wilkinson, 
but allowed probation. 
On December 9, 1985, he was arrested and subsequently 
charged with robbery. On February 7, 1986, he was brought before 
Judge Wilkinson on an Order to Show Cause why his probation 
should not be revoked. The affidavit in support of the Motion 
for Order to Show Cause alleged that he committed robbery and, in 
addition, that he had failed to report to his probation officer, 
had failed to make restitution, and had failed to participate in 
a program to complete community service hours as ordered by the 
Court. The petitioner admitted to the allegations of the 
Complaint. At that time he had already pled guilty to the 
robbery charge, but had not been sentenced as yet. 
CANDELARIO V. SHULSEN PAGE TWO ORDER DENYING WRIT 
A week later, on February 14, 1986, the petitioner appeared 
before Judge Sawaya for sentencing on the robbery charge. Judge 
Sawaya sentenced him to 1 to 15 years in the Utah State Prison. 
On April 11, 1986, petitioner was again brought before Judge 
Wilkinson on an Order to Show Cause why his probation should not 
be revoked. This time the affidavit alleged only the robbery 
charge. At this second hearing, Judge Wilkinson determined to 
revoke the petitionees probation and commit him to prison on the 
original aggravated robbery charge. He also indicated that the 5 
to life term on the first charge would be served concurrently 
with the 1 to 15 sentence on the second robbery charge. 
Candelario brought this Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, 
claiming that the procedure followed violated the double jeopardy 
clause of the United States Constitution. If I understand the 
facts correctly, it appears that he was clearly brought before 
Judge Wilkinson twice on exactly the same allegation, and that 
his probation was first continued, and later revoked. The only 
issue, therefore, is whether the double jeopardy clause of the 
United States Constitution is applicable to a probation hearing. 
It appears that this is an issue which has not been decided by 
the Utah Sunreme Court--
I am of the view that the double jeopardy clause does not 
apply. The United States Supreme Court has held that the rights 
of a defendant in a probation revocation hearing (are less .than 
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those in the original criminal action. Gacrnon v. Scaroelli, 411 
U.S. 788 (1973). This is because the defendant has pled guilty 
or has been proven guilty, and is not entitled to the same 
presumptions as a defendant in a criminal action. For this 
reason, it is often said that a probation hearing is civil in 
nature, rather than criminal. Regardless of how it is 
characterized, however, it appears to me that there is much more 
flexibility in a probation hearing than in an original criminal 
trial. Once the defendant has been found guilty or has pled 
guilty, he has no vested right to even be considered for 
probation. Probation is a contract which he enters into in order 
to avoid the sentence which could justly be imposed according to 
law. The Judge has the right to impose any condition upon 
probation, and the defendant has the right to reject any 
condition so imposed, and take the prison sentence instead. If 
he does accept probation along with its conditions, he must also 
realize that his rights under the probation agreement are not 
protected by the Constitution in the same way that the rights of 
a criminal defendant are protected. 
I believe the logic of Davenport v. State, (Ct. of 
Crim.App.Tex. 1978), is applicable and persuasive in this case. 
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Consequently, the State's Motion to Dismiss is granted. The 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is denied. 
Dated this ^ dav of July, 1987. 
SCOTT DANIELS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Order Denying Writ of Habeas Corpus, postage 
prepaid, to the following, this day of July, 1987: 
Tracy Allen Candelario 
Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
Philip G. Jones 
Attorney for Petitioner 
930 S. State Street, Suite 10 
Orem, Utah 84058 
Stuart W. Hinckley 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondent 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
ADDENDUM "B" ORDER DISMISSING EXTRA-ORDINARY WRIT 
R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312) 
Attorney General 
PAUL M. TINKER (3274) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendants 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1020 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TRACY CANDELARIO, l 
Plaintiff, : ORDER 
vs.- : 
GERALD COOK, Warden, Utah : Civil No. 880907135 
State Prison, State of Utah, 
: Judge John Rokich 
Defendants. 
This matter came on for hearing on plaintiff's Petition 
for Writ of Habeas Corpus and defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
before the Court on January 30, 1989, at 3:00 p.m. The 
Petitioner was present and was represented by his counsel, Mark 
H. Tanner. Respondent was represented by Paul M. Tinker, 
Assistant Attorney General. 
The Court, having reviewed the pleadings and other 
documents in the file, and having read the memoranda of counsel, 
and having heard the oral representations of counsel, and being 
fully advised in the premises, now hereby 
ORDERS that this action is dismissed with prejudice as 
being barred by the doctrine of res judicata and for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 
Dated this day of February, 1988. 
BY THE COURT 
JOHN A. ROKICH, JUDGE 
Third District Court 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and 
exact copy of the foregoing proposed Order to Mark H. Tanner, 
attorney for the plaintiff, P.O. Box 1148, Castle Dale, Utah 
84513 on this the ;t day of February, 1989. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, Mark H. Tanner, do hereby certify that on the [V& day of 
July, 1989, I sent to Paul VanDam, Utah Attorney General, Room 236, 
State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, four copies of 
the Appellant's Brief, by depositing same in the U.S. Mail, postage 
fully prepaid. 
